

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT		25X1
SUBJECT	Comments on the Change in Leadership in the Soviet Union	DATE DISTR.	MAR 2 1955	
		NO. OF PAGES	2	
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD	25X1
		REFERENCES		25X1
This is UNEVALUATED Information				

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. From the very beginning of the Soviet regime there has never been an example of true collective leadership. Always the ultimate power has been in the hands of one man. Nor is the populace accustomed to anything else. N.S. Khrushchev has always had his eye on supreme power, especially since Stalin's death. G.M. Malenkov, possessing greater popularity and holding more authoritative posts in the period immediately after Stalin's death, succeeded in preventing the immediate fulfillment of Khrushchev's ambitions. But Khrushchev was not idle in building up loyalty by Party members to him and in winning over public opinion. He travelled widely in the Soviet Union, and made numerous speeches and public appearances. One of the main reasons for the removal of Malenkov was Khrushchev's desire to be without a powerful competitor. But Khrushchev has not the talent, experience, or shrewdness to become another unchallenged Stalin.
2. The decisive cause of the split was foreign policy. Malenkov and his supporters aimed at achieving at least a temporary coexistence with the West to give them time to raise living standards and to consolidate their position inside the country. To this end, they were even willing to make concessions to the West. Khrushchev and his followers do not feel that coexistence is possible. They feel war is inevitable. Hence, no concessions are to be made and production must be geared to war-preparedness. In other words, there will be a continuation of the hard policy of Stalin. There will be changes made in the budget, regardless of bookkeeping or other inconveniences. Allocations may simply be shifted about without publicity.
3. Malenkov is more russophile than Khrushchev.

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